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Abstract
A dynamical model is introduced for the formation of a bullish or
bearish trends driving an asset price in a given market. Initially, each
agent decides to buy or sell according to its personal opinion, which
results from the combination of its own private information, the pub-
lic information and its own analysis. It then adjusts such opinion
through the market as it observes sequentially the behavior of a group
of random selection of other agents. Its choice is then determined by
a local majority rule including itself. Whenever the selected group is
at a tie, i.e., it is undecided on what to do, the choice is determined
by the local group belief with respect to the anticipated trend at that
time. These local adjustments create a dynamic that leads the mar-
ket price formation. In case of balanced anticipations the market is
found to be efficient in being successful to make the “right price” to
emerge from the sequential aggregation of all the local individual infor-
mations which all together contain the fundamental value. However,
when a leading optimistic belief prevails, the same efficient market
mechanisms are found to produce a bullish dynamic even though most
agents have bearish private informations. The market yields then a
wider and wider discrepancy between the fundamental value and the
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market value, which in turn creates a speculative bubble. Neverthe-
less, there exists a limit in the growing of the bubble where private
opinions take over again and at once invert the trend, originating a
sudden bearish trend. Moreover, in the case of a drastic shift in the
collective expectations, a huge drop in price levels may also occur ex-
tremely fast and puts the market out of control, it is a market crash.
Key words: renormalization group, sociophysics, opinion dynamic, fi-
nance
2
1 From the idea of each agent to the opinion
of everyone
In this paper, I apply sociophysics [1, 2, 3] to the analysis of the aggregation
of opinions in financial markets. A simple model is shown to describe the
movement of a stock price far away from its fundamental value, through a
process of iterations of individual decisions made by agents which interact
by groups of odd or even size. Under certain social psychological configu-
rations of the market, and depending on the parity of the size of the local
groups, individual opinions combination can lead the stock price to reflect
its fundamental value or be fundamentally different from it [4].
A theoretical basis is thus provided to Keynes view that stock prices can
and actually differ from their fundamental values [5, 6]. Some models used
in physics appear to be well adapted to the formalization of this perspective
[7, 8, 9, 10] along a huge collection of works in economy [11, 12, 13, 14]
with much attention being devoted to the formation of bubbles and crashes
[15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
The novelty of the model presented here lies in the use of a single frame
which embodies both the market efficiency and the formation of bubble as
well as their burst. Although very simple, my scheme is able to explain
two important insights by Keynes on how individual opinions combine and
lead to a collective bullish or bearish behavior, and how expectations by
agents can, in some cases, compromise the efficiency of the market pricing
process, then reducing drastically the impact of individual information on
the global outcome of the market process. However the distortion of the
market efficiency is bounded and beyond some gap, the efficiency is brutally
restored spontaneously. The model relies one my earlier works on opinion
dynamics in social issues [23, 24].
1.1 Microstructure of the market and aggregation of
individual opinions using the local sharing of in-
formations
Generally speaking, this approach is part of a broader increased attention to
the aggregation of individual opinions in the last twenty years or so, especially
on market microstructure and the way personal individual information are
combined by the market equilibrium. Generally, these works are based on
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the hypothesis of lags in knowledge acquisition between agents. This leads
them to influence and imitate each other in featuring mimetic behaviors. In
this context, sociophysics adds to these works by analyzing decision-making
processes among groups of individuals with financial operators being divided
into local groups like traders, portfolio managers, arbitrageurs and others.
The model explains how the structure of these groups governs the way of
information processing by the market.
As done by usual models of market microstructure [25], the fundamental
hypothesis is here that if one could gather all the information held by all
agents, one should be able to come up with a price that equals the funda-
mental value. In other terms, I suppose that the market is efficient in the
usual meaning. However, one agent alone never has all the information, and
thus is not able to come up with the fundamental value by itself alone. Only
the financial investors taken as a whole are able to fairly price an asset. More
precisely, if V is the fundamental value of a firm, I suppose that V is close to
the amount estimated by each agent Vi = V + vi. This fundamental hypoth-
esis implies then that the expected value of vi is zero by aggregation of all
agents i. From this perspective, market efficiency means here the capacity
of the market pricing process to reveal the fundamental value that would be
known by financial investors as a whole.
Furthermore, I assume that the market clearing price is fixed according to
some rule based upon excess of demand or supply. In particular, when they
are equal, the market price does not change. Any supply (demand) excess
will lead to a decreasing (increasing) change of the market price, while the
change process stops whenever the market reaches an down (up) limit when
all the agents wish to sell (buy). In fact, modeling the market microstructure
is beyond the scope of this paper and is left to a further exercise [26, 27].
1.2 Common beliefs and the market pricing process
The approach consists in modeling agents which get and process informa-
tion in some iterative learning way. This process can drive the actual stock
price to move substantially away from its fundamental value. Under certain
circumstances, the market seems then inefficient. I will show why and for
what reasons a market that is expected to be efficient in treating all personal
information can lead instead to a stock price that reflects collective beliefs
that diverge from the fundamental value.
In the first case the market seems efficient whereas in the second case,
it seems inefficient, even though similar mechanisms are in play. In fact,
in the first case, the market is a machine that discloses the true value of a
firm, whereas in the second case, the market is a mechanism that produces
baseless financial representations of that value.
My simplified model aims to describe in a coherent and homogenous way
the formation of speculative bubbles and market crashes enlightening the
role of common beliefs in the process of stock prices formation. The goal of
this paper is to illustrate the conceptual contribution of sociophysics to the
formation of speculative bubbles.
1.3 Modeling the Learning Process
Consider a population of N agents, each having a different opinion based
on its information about a given stock in a given market. I suppose that
the aggregation of all the information held by every agent would provide the
fundamental stock price.
In order to describe a complex reality, two essential processes are distin-
guished in individual decision making. Every agent is supposed to go first
into its own personal analysis using its own information around selling or
buying the stock. Then, because its information is incomplete, it will adjust
its own opinion to take into account those of other agents. But, in order
to avoid mimicking potentially bad decisions from others, it will proceed
sequentially through successive steps and vary the group of agents that it
consults. Each agent keeps reproducing this process until it gets a clear-cut
buying or selling signal.
I further suppose that all agents have the same power of influence on each
other. There is no leader or guru. In addition, buying or selling decisions
are all made simultaneously by all agents. Accordingly, one agent cannot
postpone its decision to wait for a favorable time to buy or sell. The iterative
process is imposed to all agents. Such iterative process is then exogenous,
not endogenous, although it is internal to the agent community.
The first mechanism starts with the market opening, each agent having
made its own personal decision to buy or sell. The opening price results from
all these decisions. Then a quest for the fundamental value begins through
a sequence of local optimizations in which agents will collectively determine
their choice by a rule of majority. This is why the model is iterative and
describes an interactive learning process by the decisions of other agents.
At the end of the day, when the market closes, two configurations are
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possible. Either there is still a split between the agents about their decision
to buy or sell, or all agents end up with the same decision. In the first case,
the stock Exchange closes up or down, this change being justified by the
fundamental stock value. In the second case, the stock cannot trade because
all agents are either buyers or sellers, the stock has then attained its up
or down limit. The next morning, every agent adjusts its position to take
into account the latest closing stock price. In the following, I shall see how
a market can prove efficient or inefficient depending on conditions that are
specified below
2 Distinctive stock market dynamics
2.1 The case of efficient market
Consider a stock whose fundamental value in a given day is above its market
price. For instance, if 60% of information gives a bullish signal and 40% of
information gives a bearish signal, there will be a 20% discrepancy around
the fundamental value. However, no single agent knows all the information
required to value the stock. On the contrary, each agent has only two guesses
or positions to be chosen, i;e., bullish or bearish. Hence at the opening time,
60% of agents would buy and 40% would sell.
I introduce then a partition of the trading day in a certain number of
interactions. Time is measured by these interactions. Thus, between the
beginning (t = 0) and the end of the day (t = T ), at each interaction time,
there is a proportion of buyers pt and sellers 1− pt, no inactive agents being
included. At the beginning of the day, there are p0 buyers (in the previous
example p0 = 60%) and 1− pt sellers.
The dynamic to compute pt, i.e., the proportion of buyers at each time
t as a function of the initial proportion of buyers p0 has thus to defined.
As explained before, agents sequentially adjust their decision by observing
decisions by others. To do that, each agent interact within a certain group
of agents around it. The parity of the size of this group is crucial. For sake
of simplicity, I consider here only the two cases of groups of size three and
four.
Groups of odd size in the case of odd size with three agents, each agent
compares its decision with 2 other agents taken randomly among all agents.
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Agents are thus grouped by three. Inside each of these groups, a common
decision is made according to the local majority of the initial decisions of the
three agents. If two agents are buyers (sellers) and one is seller (buyer), the
seller (buyer) changes its mind and decide to buy as the others wish to do.
The following relation holds then between pt+1 and pt,
P3(pt) ≡ pt+1 = p3t + 3 p2t (1− pt) . (1)
Thanks to this relation, the evolution of the share of buyers pt with respect
to the time t can be observed during a trading day. At the end of the day,
I suppose that all agents make their own decisions to buy or sell the next
morning, taking into account the latest closing stock price combined with
their respective private informations.
The dynamic produced by Eq. (1) is monitored by its fixed points, which
are obtained by solving the equation pt+1 = pt. The solutions are pS = 0,
pc,3 = 0.50 and pB = 1. The first fixed point results from a drop in the
stock price until a state denoted the down limit because all agents conclude
with the same decision to sell. The last fixed point results from the rise of
the stock price until a symmetric state is reached with an up limit. The
fixed point pc,3 = 0.50 results from a perfect equilibrium of the market with
exactly as many buyers as sellers. The stock price remains stable, and so
does the fundamental value.
Stability of equilibria Studying the stability of the fixed points pc,3 is
found to unstable whereas pS and pB are stable. If pt goes slightly away
from pS or pB, Eq. (1) makes it go back towards it. On the contrary, if pt
moves a bit from the fixed point pc,3, Eq. (1) takes it even further in the
same direction. Around pc,3 a buyers excess will generate the appreciation
of the stock price, while a sellers excess will result in a stock price decrease.
Figures (1, 2, 3) illustrate different aspects of this phenomenon.
Figure (1) illustrates how the market treats fragmented pieces of infor-
mation in the right direction. If at the opening time, there are more bullish
than bearish signals, the stock will go up during the day. The market is effi-
cient at the informational level. Figure (2) shows the variation of pt during
the day for different starting shares of buyers among the whole population
with p0 = 0.48.0.50.0.52, 0.54, · · · , 0.98, 1. For instance, p0 = 0.48 yields 12
interactions to have the market reach its state of down limit. The proportion
p0 = 0 is then reproduced endlessly.
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Symmetrically, 12 iterations are also required to reach the state of limit
up but starting from p0 = 0.52. Only at exactly p0 = 0.50 the proportion is
invariant under an infinite number of iterations.
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the variations of pt+1 in function of pt. The
arrows indicate the direction of the buying flow. For an initial proportion
below pc,3 = 0.50, pt goes towards the attractor state of down limit, while
it goes towards the attractor state of up limit for a proportion greater than
pc,3 = 0.50.
Attracteur p V=1Attracteur p A=0
SEPARATEUR
50%
Figure 1: An efficient market : 2 attractors at 0 and 1, and a separator at 0.
I have therefore obtained a market that works efficiently by transform-
ing information into prices by successive steps, this transformation leading
the stock price toward its fundamental value. If the mechanism starts with
private information leading to a majority of agents being bullish (bearish),
it implies by assumption that the fundamental value of the stock is lower
(higher) than its market price. Thus, as interactions go on, the resulting
stock market pricing process should and will, push the market higher (lower)
in the direction of the fundamental value. However, if an attractor is reached,
the dynamic loses contact with the fundamentals of the stock, and the market
gets to its up or down limits. It is important to notice that, in this model, a
state of down limit down can happen without any previous rise of the stock
price.
What happens the next morning when the market opens again? After a
rise (drop) justified by the fundamental value of the stock, a lower proportion
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P0=0.48
P0=0.52
P0=0.50
Figure 2: An efficient market : variation of pt for groups of size 3 in function
of p0.
of buyers (sellers) will usually occur, leading the stock price to reach the
separator that is its fundamental value. This adjustment allows avoiding the
perpetuation of up or down limits over time that would lead eventually to a
market crash or a bubble.
Alarm signals for market breakdowns In this model, the discrepancy
between the fundamental value and the market price determines the number
of interactions required to reach either one of the two attractors. The more
the initial proportion of buyers is far away from the separator, the smaller
this number is, and the more likely is a crash or a bubble to occur. This
number can be computed to be approximately as
n ≃ − ln | pc,3 − p0 |
ln(3/2)
(2)
Above number is approximated up to the greater integer. It is noticed
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 pt
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pt+1
Separateur
50 %
Limit up
Limit down
Figure 3: An efficient market: variation of pt+1 in function of pt for groups
of size 3.
that n is always a small number as Figure (2)) shows. For instance, if p0 =
0.45, the formula (2) gives n = 8 meaning that starting from an initial
proportion of buyers of 45% , the market reaches a state of limit down after
only 8 transactions. In other terms, if there is a 5% lack of buyers of the
stock, the driving mechanism of the stock price will push the market lower
until it reaches a state of limit down after 8 interactions. This implies a
cumulative amplification of the difference between the number of sellers and
the number of buyers. The number of buyers decreases according to Eq. (1).
Starting from the initial value p0 = 0.45 I successively get as proportions of
buyers the values p1 = 0.42, p2 = 0.39, p3 = 0.34, p4 = 0.26, p5 = 0.17,
p6 = 0.08, p7 = 0.02 and p8 = 0.00. At the 8th interaction, there is no more
buyers, the state reaches the down limit and the process stops.
The formula (2) therefore enables to simulate the behavior of buyers and
to predict the occurrence of a brutal drop of the market price (up to its down
limit). However, the formula is less efficient for proportions p0 of buyers that
would be already closed to attractors, depicting a market process potentially
stopped. In such situation that is too close to a market stop the number
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of interactions which separates the market from a state of down or up limit
has to be evaluated by an explicit iteration of Eq. (1). The Figure (4)
is an illustration of this phenomenon. The number of iterations does not
become equal to zero for the proportions p0 = 0 and p0 = 1. Actually, in
the vicinities of both attractors, the formula (2) has to be adjusted by the
quantity ln(1/2)/ ln(3/2).
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 p0
10
20
30
40
Quotations
Groupe taille 4
Anticipation pessimiste
Groupe taille 3
Groupe taille 4
Anticipation optimiste
Figure 4: Number of iterations required to reach an attractor from an initial
proportion of p0 for groups of size 3 and 4. In the last case both optimistic
and pessimistic anticipations are shown.
2.2 The case of market inefficiency
So far, the model has described an efficient market, since the market mech-
anism makes the stock price reaching its fundamental value from the con-
frontation of buying and selling by partially informed agents. Moreover, the
market dynamic that results from their aggregation is perfectly symmetric
whether the stock price increases or decreases. This shall be no longer the
case when groups of even size are considered.
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Groups of even size and the formation of a doubt Lets consider now
a different market situation. Instead of interacting with two other agents,
every agent now considers the decisions from three other agents. The market
population is then organized by groups of size 4. In this case, a new possi-
bility emerges when there are as many buyers as there are sellers in a group
(2 buyers and 2 sellers). The majority choice cannot solve this situation.
Accordingly the agents in such a group must find another way out of this
paralyzing doubt.
I make the assumption that, in a situation of doubt, a collective decision
to buy or sell is made based on the collective current consensus for the eco-
nomical sector the stock belongs to, that is, the socio-psychological mood of
the market in that sector. If the consensus is optimistic, the group of agents
collectively decide to buy, otherwise it sell. This assumption allows studying
the effect of this collective expectation subsuming the current mood of con-
sensus, on the efficiency property of the market. In order to do so, Eq. (1)
needs to be rewritten with a further determination of the novel location of
the separator.
To take into account the psychological collective mood, I introduce a
new parameter k which measures the optimism level for the sector the stock
belongs to. Thus, k = 1 depicts a completely optimistic atmosphere, leading
all doubting groups to buy in case of a local doubt. On the contrary, k = 0
depicts a completely pessimistic mood, leading people to sell in case of a
doubt. More realistically, k can take values between 0 and 1. Following
the ongoing changes in the mood, this value can vary day by day, slowly or
quickly. The general mood which used to be optimistic may then become
abruptly pessimistic or vice-vera. With the introduction of this confidence
parameter, Eq. (1) is generalized as follows,
P4(pt) ≡ pt+1 = p4t + 4 p3t (1− p) + 6kp2t (1− pt)2 . (3)
Like Eq. (1), this equation gives the proportion of buyers pt+1 at time (t+1)
in function of the proportion of buyers pt at time t.
Changes in the proportion of buyers Fom Eq. (3) the equation p∗ =
P4(p
∗) yields again the two previous attractors pS = 0 and pAB = 1, but the
separator pkc,4 has shifted from the middle point with p
k
c,4 6= 0.50) at a value
given by
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pkc,4 =
(6k − 1)−√13− 36k + 36k2
6(2k − 1) . (4)
This value depends on k, the degree of optimism of the market. The complete
optimism (k = 1) gives,
p1c,4 =
5−√13
6
≃ 0.23 , (5)
while the complete pessimism (k = 0) gives the separator value,
p1c,4 =
1 +
√
13
6
≃ 0.77 . (6)
Above two values represent the two bounds between which the separator
can vary. This means that, in a frankly optimistic atmosphere, it suffices to
have 23% of buyers instead of 50% in an efficient market, to modify market
equilibrium. Reciprocally, a very pessimistic atmosphere requires 77% of
buyers to influence market equilibrium against 50% in an efficient market.
As expected, for a balance collective mood, i.e., k = 0.50 yields p0.50c,4 = 0.50
as in the previous model. Figure (5) shows the varying range of the separator.
What happens to the efficiency property of our market? When 0.50 < k <
1 the psychological mood is optimistic. Therefore, even if the proportion of
buyers pt is less than 50% down to the limit of 23%, the power of the collective
belief ,which is optimistic with respect to the future of the asset, pushes the
stock price up. In the same way, in a negative psychological mood, as long as
the proportion of buyers remains below 77%, the stock price will be driven
down.
In other words, a separator away from the middle value 0.50 makes the
market inefficient since the stock price can go in an opposite direction to what
the majority of agents taken individually would think it should go. Such
uncertainty makes the market process dependent on the market atmosphere.
The psychological mood may, in certain situations, bias significantly the
market dynamic. The aggregation of all pieces of information by the market
may then lead to the wrong conclusion by the majority of agents. Figure (7)
illustrates this mechanism.
In particular, the market will push higher an already overvalued stock,
as illustrated in Figure (7), in the case of a totally optimistic common belief
(k = 1). In all situations where the general market mood is determinant,
only the neutral value k = 0.50 makes the market efficient with p0.50c,4 = 0.50.
13
Attracteur p V=1Attracteur p A=0
X
50%23%
SEPARATEUR
Attracteur p V=1Attracteur p A=0
X
50% 77%
SEPARATEUR
Figure 5: Direction of the dynamic of sequential change of the proportion
of buyers, with two attractors at 0 and 1 for groups of size 4. On top,
the anticipation is fully optimistic with k = 1, which sets the separator at
23%. On bottom the anticipation is fully pessimistic with k = 0 setting the
separator at 77%.
However, the market inefficiency has well defined limits. For instance, in
a speculative bullish market, private information can become so negative that
it can reestablish the market efficiency by successfully counterbalancing the
bias created by the market atmosphere. In this case, the market will start to
be driven down after a continued and unjustified bullish period. The market
mechanism eventually overcomes the distortion implied by the psychological
anticipation and proves efficient again. This process of readjustment may be
partially smooth and stay under control as shown in Figures (7) and (8). On
these figures, the initial proportion of buyers or sellers are very close to the
separator p0 ≃ 0.23 that exhibits the limit of the inefficiency of the market.
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 k
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pc,4
Anticipation pessimiste
0.5<Pc,4<0.77
Anticipation optimiste
0.23<Pc,4<0.5
Figure 6: Location of the separator pkc,4 as a function of the psychological
mood k. An optimistic mood (0.50 < k ≤ 1) yields 0.23 < pkc,4 < 0.50
whereas a pessimistic mood (0 ≤ k < 0.50)) gives 0.50 < pkc,4 < 0.77. The
discrepancy between pkc,4 and 0.50 is the source of the market inefficiency as
shown in the area on each side of p0.50c,4 = 0.50.
2.3 Speculative bubbles and crashes
Change in collective beliefs and sharp corrections I have analyzed
the limits of the inefficiency of the market in this model. I can now study
the conditions for which the market beaks into a crash. Such a drastic event
is naturally obtained within our model. Indeed, I have considered so far
the market atmosphere constant with time. However, changes in the general
market mood can occur for a variety of reasons with as well its direction as
its intensity.
For instance, in the previous case of a very optimistic mood (k = 1) with
a separator set at p1c,4 ≃ 0.23, I saw that the market can regain its efficiency if
it goes too far in the wrong direction. However, it is possible that, before the
market starts to correct itself, the general anticipation brutally changes to
shift into a very pessimistic mood (k = 0) after having been very optimistic.
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2 4 6 8 10 12 Quotations
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pt
p0=0.25
p0=0.23
p0=0.21
Figure 7: Variation of pt for groups of size 4 in a very optimistic collective
mood (k = 1) as a function of the initial proportions of buyers. The initial
proportions vary from p0 = p
1
c,4 + µ × δ × 0.01 with p1c,4 ≃ 0.23 and δ =
0.1, 2, · · · , 77 for µ = +1 and δ = 0.1, 2, ..., 23 for µ = −1.
In such a situation, the drop of the stock price is not a smooth process
anymore. In that case, the separator jumps at once from p1c,4 ≃ 0.23 up
to p0c,4 ≃ 0.77 It may then take only two or three update sequences for the
market to reach a state of down limit. The extreme speed of the stock move
thwarts the rebalancing of the next day and a self-increasing panic appears.
Figure (9) illustrates the evolution of such a scenario for different initial
proportions of buyers.
In the case of an optimistic expectations, the market regains its previous
bullish dynamics except for p0 = 0.23, which leads to a smooth decrease of
the stock price. On the contrary, if expectations are pessimistic, the decrease
of the stock price is brutal, especially when the initial proportion of buyers
is small compared to 0.5. To illustrate this mechanism of rupture, consider
a market with an initial proportion of buyers p0 = 0.43 or 0.33 under an
optimistic climate. Even if less than half operators are bullish, the stock
price will go up. But if the general mood of operators happens to change,
16
5 10 15 20 Quotations
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pt
p0=0.233
p0=0.231
p0=0.232
Figure 8: Variation of p(t) for groups of size 4 in a very optimistic mood
(k=1) as a function of initial proportions of buyers which vary from p0 =
pc,4 ± 0.001 × δ with p1c,4 ≃ 0.23 and δ = 0, 1, 2, , 10. That is the limit
of malfunctioning of the market: a correction in the stock price remains
smooth.
the stock can violently crashes as seen from Figure (9).
Conclusive remarks I have shown how a simple sociophysics approach
can disclose important features which are instrumental in the making of
the stock market dynamics. In particular, these features shed light on the
influence of collective beliefs on stock price formation paving the way to the
study of mental representations in play in speculative mechanisms. However,
the same features produce the limit of common beliefs on biaising the market
efficiency.
Two distinctive mechanisms characterizing the stock market have been
singled out. The first one exhibits the aggregation of the agent private in-
formations through the market to treat all scattered and incomplete infor-
mations to reproduce the fundamental value. At this stage I have been able
to build an efficient market. The second mechanism is more subtle trying to
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2 4 6 8 10 12 Quotations
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pt
Figure 9: Variation of pt for groups of size 4 with both optimistic and pes-
simistic moods. Different initial proportions of buyers are shown, which all
lead to a bearish market for k = 0. For k = 1 on the contrary, they all
lead to a bullish market except for p0 = 0.23. A change in the psychological
anticipation triggers the crash.
embody the effect of of the collective beliefs regarding the future stock price
evolution into the process of the agent decision making. On this basis I have
shown that in case a gap occurs between a strong belief and the fundamental
value, the market becomes inefficient with the emergence of a speculative
bubble. However, the general belief can only bias the market up to a certain
point beyond which private information is so unbalanced that its drive back
the stock price toward its fundamental value. This process, if accompanied
by a shift in the general belief, can be extremely brutal and leads to a market
crash.
In upcoming work I will introduce different types of agents like contrarians
and inflexibles in the market dynamics. They were found to have drastic
effect on the landscape of the opinion dynamics of social systems [28, 29,
30]. I hope my results could be helpful for a better understanding of the
fundamental trends of the market even though they are not an accurate
18
description of the reality.
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